Robert C. Shipman, Kathleen M. Rollman; Dale Sweat, Individually And For And On Behalf Of West Jordan City v. Donna Evans, Mayor of West Jordan City, Donna Evans, an individual; Andrew Allison, West Jordan City Council Member, Andrew Allison, an individual; Lyle Summers, an Individual; Carolyn Nelson, West Jordan City Council Member; Carolyn Nelson, an individual : Brief of Appellee by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2002
Robert C. Shipman, Kathleen M. Rollman; Dale
Sweat, Individually And For And On Behalf Of
West Jordan City v. Donna Evans, Mayor of West
Jordan City, Donna Evans, an individual; Andrew
Allison, West Jordan City Council Member,
Andrew Allison, an individual; Lyle Summers, an
Individual; Carolyn Nelson, West Jordan City
Council Member; Carolyn Nelson, an individual :
Brief of Appellee
Utah Supreme CourtFollow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Kenneth R. Ivory; Attorney for Appellants.
W. Cullen Battle; J. David Pearce; Fabian & Clendenin; Attorneys for Appellees.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Shipman v. Evans, No. 20020103.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2097
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT C. SHIPMAN, KATHLEEN 
M. ROLLMAN; DALE SWEAT, 
Individually And For And On Behalf Of 
WEST JORDAN CITY, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
DONNA EVANS, Mayor of West 
Jordan City, DONNA EVANS, an 
individual; ANDREW ALLISON, West 
Jordan City Council Member, ANDREW 
ALLISON, an individual; LYLE 
SUMMERS, West Jordan City Council, 
LYLE SUMMERS, an Individual; 
CAROLYN NELSON, West Jordan City 
Council Member; CAROLYN NELSON, 
an individual, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
APPELLEES' BRIEF 
Supreme Court No. 20020103-SC 
Priority No. 15 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLEES DONNA EVANS, ANDREW ALLISON, LYLE 
SUMMERS AND CAROLYN NELSON 
Appeal from a Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Sandy 
Department, Honorable Denise Lindberg, District Judge 
KENNETH R. IVORY 
Kenneth R. Ivory, P.C. 
895 W. Baxter Drive 
South Jordan, Utah 84095 
Attorney for Appellants 
W. CULLEN BATTLE 
J. DAVID PEARCE 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0210 
Telephone: (801)531-8900 
Attorneys for Appellees 
FILED 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
SEP 2 3 2002 
PAT BARTHOLOMEW 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT C. SHIPMAN, KATHLEEN 
M. ROLLMAN; DALE SWEAT, 
Individually And For And On Behalf Of 
WEST JORDAN CITY, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
DONNA EVANS, Mayor of West 
Jordan City, DONNA EVANS, an 
individual; ANDREW ALLISON, West 
Jordan City Council Member, ANDREW 
ALLISON, an individual; LYLE 
SUMMERS, West Jordan City Council, 
LYLE SUMMERS, an Individual; 
CAROLYN NELSON, West Jordan City 
Council Member; CAROLYN NELSON, 
an individual, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
APPELLEES' BRIEF 
Supreme Court No. 20020103-SC 
Priority No. 15 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLEES DONNA EVANS, ANDREW ALLISON, LYLE 
SUMMERS AND CAROLYN NELSON 
Appeal from a Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Sandy 
Department, Honorable Denise Lindberg, District Judge 
KENNETH R. IVORY 
Kenneth R. Ivory, P.C. 
895 W. Baxter Drive 
South Jordan, Utah 84095 
Attorney for Appellants 
W. CULLEN BATTLE 
J. DAVID PEARCE 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0210 
Telephone: (801)531-8900 
Attorneys for Appellees 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(b), Defendants and Appellees, 
Donna Evans, Andrew Allison, Lyle Summers and Carolyn Nelson (collectively referred 
to as the "City"), hereby submit the following Brief in Response to Appellant's Opening 
Brief. 
LIST OF PARTIES 
The parties to this appeal are identified in the caption herein. 
Defendants/Appellees also officially represent the City of West Jordan. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS OVER THIS CASE 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
STATUTES AND RULES WHICH ARE DETERMINATIVE OR OF CENTRAL 
IMPORTANCE TO THIS APPEAL 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
A. Nature of the Case 3 
B. Course of Proceedings 4 
C. Statement of Facts 7 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 11 
ARGUMENT . 12 
/. PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER THE 
PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL EXCEPTION TO THE TRADITIONAL 
AMERICAN RULE GOVERNING ATTORNEY'S FEES 12 
A. The District Court Did Not Commit Procedural Error in Dismissing Plaintiffs' 
Cause of Action for Attorney's Fees 13 
B. The District Court Correctly Determined That Plaintiffs Were Not Entitled to 
Attorney's Fees 14 
1. Plaintiffs were not the "prevailing party" 15 
a. Plaintiffs did not receive a judgment or relief on the merits 15 
b. Plaintiffs are not a "prevailing party" under the catalyst theory 16 
2. Plaintiffs have not shown that they vindicated an important public policy for 
broad public benefit 19 
a. Violation of an ordinance does not necessarily not rise to the level of 
important public policy 20 
b. The Selling of City Property Does Not Necessarily Rise to the Level of 
Important Public Policy 22 
C. The repeal of the Amendment did not occur "but for" Plaintiffs' action 22 
259145.1 
i 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' 
DECLARATORY RELIEF CLAIM BECAUSE THE ISSUES RAISED WERE 
MOOT 23 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' 
DECLARATORY RELIEF CAUSE OF ACTION BECAUSE THE CAUSE OF 
ACTION FAILED AS A MATTER OF LAW 23 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERROR IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' 
CAUSE OF ACTION TO REMOVE THE VALIDLY ELECTED CITY COUNCIL 
MEMBERS OF WEST JORDAN CITY 24 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' 
FIRST AND SECOND CAUSES OF ACTION 27 
VI. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT DEFENDANTS 
WERE NOT IN CRIMINAL CONTEMPT 29 
VII. THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDERS SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED FOR 
FAILURE TO ENTER SPECIFIC FINDNGS OF FACT 33 
A. Dismissal of the Complaint/Petition 33 
B. Contempt Proceedings 34 
CONCLUSION 36 
259145J 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Federal Cases 
Buckhannon Bd. v. West Virginia D.H.H.R., 532 U.S. 598, 604-05 (2001) passim 
State Cases 
A.K. & R. Whipple Plumb, and Heat. v. Guy, 2002 UT App 73, 47 P.3d 92 (2002) 15 
Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33,44 P.3d 781 15 
Bairdv. State, 574 P.2d 713 (Utah 1978) 23 
Broadbent v. Bd. OfEduc. Of Cache Cfy., 910 P.2d 1274 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert, 
denied, 917 P.2d 556 (Utah 1996) 26 
Butler v. Butler, 461 P.2d 727 (1969) 2,30 
D.H. v. West Valley City, 840P.2d 115 (Utah 1992) 26 
Faust v. KAI Technologies, 2000 UT 82, 15 P.3d 1266 14 
Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City, 997 P.2d 321 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) 28 
In re Estate of West, 948 P.2d 351 (Utah 1997) 1, 2 
Millinerv. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974) 26 
Neerings v. Utah State Bar, 817 P.2d 320 (Utah, 1991) 34 
Nelson v. Div. Of Peace Officer Standards & Training, 851 P.2d 1201 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) 26 
R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11,40 P.3d 119 1 
Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City ofSpringville, 979 P.2d 332, 338 
(Utah 1999) 21,27 
State v. Jones, 407 P.2d 571 (Utah 1965) 26 
259145_1 
iii 
Stewart v. Utah Public Service Comm'n, 885 P.2d 759 (Utah 1994) 14, 15 
Stone v. Salt Lake City, 356P.2d631 (Utah 1960) 24 
Taylor v. City of Lenoir, 558 S.E.2d 242 (N.C. App. 2002) 17 
Utahv. Hurst, 821 P.2d467 (Utah App. Ct. 1991) 34, 35 
Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988) 29,30,31 
Woodland Hill Residents Assoc. Inc., et. al. v. City Council of Los Angeles, 593 P.2d 200 
(Cal. 1979) 20 
State Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-826 24 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-2 22, 23 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-8 22, 24 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 passim 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-6-1 passim 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-6-4 24, 25 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-30) 1 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)0) and 2(4) 1 
259145_1 
iv 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS OVER THIS CASE 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated Section78-2-3(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Pursuant to Rule 24(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the City 
submits its own statement of the issues on appeal. The City does not cite to the record 
showing how each issue was preserved on appeal, as this is Plaintiffs' duty. 
1. Whether the District Court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs' sixth cause of 
action for attorney's fees under the private attorney general doctrine, since Plaintiffs were 
not the prevailing party and failed to demonstrate that they vindicated an important public 
policy? 
Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is normally a question of law, 
reviewed for correctness. However, an award of attorney's fees under a private attorney 
general theory involves a finding that the party seeking the award is a "prevailing party." 
"This question depends, to a large measure, on the context of each case, and, therefore, it 
is appropriate to leave this determination to the sound discretion of the trial court. We 
therefore review the trial court's determination as to who was the prevailing party under 
an abuse of discretion standard." R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11 f 25,40 P.3d 
119,1127. 
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2. Whether the District Court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs' cause of action 
for declaratory relief, which requested the District Court to hold that the City could not 
dispose of City property? 
This issue involves an issue of law that the appellate court reviews for correctness 
and affords no deference to the District Court. In re Estate of West, 948 P.2d 351, 353 
(Utah 1997). 
3. Whether the District Court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs' first and second 
causes of action, which called for a determination of the legality of an amendment to the 
City's General Plan, when the amendment had been repealed and no justiciable 
controversy existed? 
This issue involves an issue of law that the appellate court reviews for correctness 
and affords no deference to the District Court. In re Estate of West, 948 P.2d 351, 353 
(Utah 1997). 
4. Whether the District Court correctly held that Utah Code Ann. § 77-6-1 et. 
al. does not provide a private cause of action? 
This issue involves an issue of law that the appellate court reviews for correctness 
and affords no deference to the District Court. In re Estate of West, 948 P.2d 351, 353 
(Utah 1997). 
5. Whether the District Court correctly held that the City was not in contempt 
of court? 
A trial court's decision in criminal contempt cases is left in the sound discretion of 
the trial court. Butler v. Butler, 461 P.2d 727 (1969). 
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STATUTES AND RULES WHICH ARE DETERMINATIVE OR OF CENTRAL 
IMPORTANCE TO THIS APPEAL 
Utah Code Ann. §10-9-1001. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-6-1, et al. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Plaintiffs' complaint in this matter sought a judicial review, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. Section 10-9-1001, of an amendment to the West Jordan City General Plan. 
Plaintiffs contended that the plan amendment failed to comply with City ordinances. 
Plaintiffs additionally brought other causes of action seeking to (1) enjoin the City from 
acting on the plan amendment; (2) enjoin the City from general planning of the Main 
Park until November 2001; (3) declaring void any ordinances which disposed of park 
property; (4) removing the Mayor and three City Council members from office; and (5) 
awarding Plaintiffs attorney's fees under the private attorney general doctrine. 
The first two causes of action were summarily dismissed when the plan 
amendment in question was repealed. The remaining causes of action were dismissed by 
the District Court as they lacked any basis in law. 
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B. Course of Proceedings 
Because Plaintiffs have misconstrued and ignored several relevant findings and 
other important aspects of the proceedings below, the City is compelled to submit its own 
Course of Proceedings. 
Plaintiffs filed this action on May 9, 2001. (R. 1.) A hearing was scheduled for 
May 21, 2001 on Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, which sought to 
enjoin the City from acting on an amendment to its General Plan (the "Plan 
Amendment"). The Plan Amendment dealt specifically with property located in the 
City's Main Park, known as the Sugar Factory (the "Sugar Factory Property"). At the 
May 21, 2001 hearing, the City stipulated that it would not take any action to (1) sell, 
lease, encumber or rezone the Sugar Factory Property, or (2) enter into any binding 
contracts that would commit the City to sell, lease, encumber or rezone the Sugar Factory 
Property, without giving Plaintiffs 45 days notice (the "Stipulation"). (R. 332-35.) The 
Stipulation was later amended to include that the City would not award any contract 
regarding the Sugar Factory Property absent notice to Plaintiffs. (R. 484-85.) 
Contrary to Plaintiffs' claims throughout their Opening Brief, the District Court 
denied Plaintiffs' motion and refused to grant injunctive relief. (See Plaintiff's Opening 
Brief at 5-6 ("the court entered its order in Plaintiffs' favor"); 6 ("Despite the court-
ordered injunction ...")). The District Court specifically held that "the court hereby 
denies plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order because plaintiffs have 
not demonstrated that they will suffer irreparable harm if a temporary restraining order is 
not issued." (R. 333.) (emphasis added). 
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On July 11, 2001, the City moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' third, fourth and fifth 
causes of action. (R. 336-38.) On July 26, 2001, Plaintiffs filed a Renewed Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction.1 (R. 355-82.) These matters were fully briefed, and on October 
22, 2001, the District Court entered an order denying Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction and granting the City's Motion to Dismiss. (R. 487-89.) 
In so ruling, the District Court held that Plaintiffs, in addition to failing to comply 
with the procedural requirements of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governing 
injunctive relief, "failed to make the necessary threshold showing to establish the grounds 
for issuance of a preliminary injunction." (R. 488.) The District Court agreed with the 
basis for the City's Motion to Dismiss counts three, four and five, and further found that 
"[gjiven this determination, plaintiffs' last count [for attorney's fees] also must fail." (R. 
488.) 
At the same time, the District Court expressed concern over allegations by 
Plaintiffs that the City had entered into a binding agreement with French & Associates for 
work on the Sugar Factory Property in violation of the Stipulation. Without a request 
from Plaintiffs, the District Court entered an Order to Show Cause why the City should 
not be held in contempt for violating the Stipulation. (R. 488.) 
On November 16, 2001, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Order 
Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Counts 3-6 of Plaintiffs' Complaint. (R. 579-
666.) In the supporting memorandum, Plaintiffs specifically argued that the District 
1
 Interestingly, if the District Court granted Plaintiffs' initial TRO Motion, as Plaintiffs 
claim, it is difficult to imagine why Plaintiffs were required to renew their motion for 
preliminary injunction. 
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Court should not have dismissed Plaintiffs' cause of action for attorney's fees under the 
private attorney general doctrine. (R. 588-90.) On November 28, 2001, the District 
Court heard oral argument on Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration. (R. 801.) During 
those arguments, the District Court was notified that the Plan Amendment at issue had 
been repealed and that an initiative had passed during the November general election. (R. 
801 at pg.6.) The newly passed initiative required a majority of West Jordan voters to 
approve any sale, lease or transfer of city land. (R. 689.) Hence, in addition to the Plan 
Amendment being repealed, it was rendered meaningless by the initiative. 
With this information, the District Court held that there was no longer a justiciable 
controversy as to Plaintiffs' first and second causes of action, both of which required an 
examination into the legality and effect of the Plan Amendment. (R. 774.) Accordingly, 
the District Court dismissed these two causes of action. The District Court also 
reaffirmed the dismissal of causes of action 3-6, including Plaintiffs' attorney's fees 
claim. (R. 774.) At that point, all of Plaintiffs' causes of action were dismissed. 
During the same hearing, the District Court took argument on its own Order to 
Show Cause why the City should not be held in contempt. (R. 801.) After hearing 
argument, the District Court determined that the City's actions were not in contempt of 
the Court and did not violate the Stipulation. (R. 773-74.) 
Undeterred by the District Court's ruling, on December 10, 2001, Plaintiffs filed 
their second Motion for Reconsideration and requested the opportunity to conduct 
discovery. (R. 744-49.) On January 18, 2002, the District Court rejected yet again 
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Plaintiffs' arguments and denied the second Motion for Reconsideration. (R. 789-92.) 
Plaintiffs appeal from each of these orders. 
C. Statement of Facts 
Plaintiffs' statement of facts ignores relevant facts, misstates others, is 
argumentative and lacks support. Accordingly, the City submits the following statement 
of facts: 
The City's Main Park is located just west of the City Offices. During the 1990's, 
the City purchased land adjacent to the Main Park, known as the Sugar Factory Property. 
Since that purchase, there has been a great deal of debate and planning regarding the 
future development of the Park. Specifically, in the Spring of 1998, West Jordan and the 
American Institution of Architects agreed to organize a Design Assistance Team 
("DAT"), which would adapt and provide ideas and recommendations for the area. (R. 
140-41.) 
Over the course of the next eighteen months, the DAT Committee held numerous 
workshops and public meetings where the committee received input from the community 
regarding a proposed plan for the Main Park. (R. 141.) The plans and ideas were then 
taken by volunteer professionals and formulated into the "Dare to Be Different" study, 
which eventually became known as the "DAT Plan". (R. 141.) The DAT Plan involved 
developing the Main Park to provide commercial and some residential use, as well as to 
expand the actual park area. Id. The purpose of the commercial and residential uses was 
to make the area more attractive for a potential TRAX station. (R. 141.) 
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The DAT Plan was presented to the City in February, 2000. (R. 246.) It was not 
immediately adopted as an element of the General Plan, but used as a planning document. 
(R. 141.) The City then directed the DAT Committee to bring back the five areas 
identified in the study. (R. 246.) The first area identified to be studied was the Sugar 
Factory Property, also referred to as areas J, K, L and N of the General Land Use Map. 
(R. 246.) 
With time, the DAT Plan garnered debate from the general public. The City 
suggested that any concerned citizens formulate their own plan for the Sugar Factory 
Property. The West Jordan Parks and Recreation Committee did just that. This 
committee was merely advisory and not a legislative body. The Parks and Recreation 
Committee eventually produced their own plan for the Sugar Factory Property (the 
"Parks and Rec Plan"). (R. 142). 
In actuality, there was little difference between the DAT Plan and the Parks and 
Rec Plan. (R. 247.) Both plans called for commercial and mixed use of the areas in 
question, including limited residential use. (R. 247.) However, the DAT Plan called for 
residential use in areas J and N, with the possibility of senior housing. (R. 247.) This 
was the principle difference between the two plans. 
In April 2001, at the Request of the City, both the Parks and Rec Plan and the 
DAT Plan were presented, to the West Jordan Planning Commission. City Staff 
recommended acceptance of the DAT Plan. However, the Planning Commission, after 
hearing debate, voted to forward a positive recommendation to the City for the Parks and 
Rec Plan, and a negative recommendation for the DAT Plan. (R. 142.) 
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On May 1, 2001, the City held a public hearing on the DAT Plan. (R. 140-48.) 
The City was notified of the conflict between the plans and the recommendations of the 
Staff and the Planning Commission. (R. 144-47.) There was substantial public debate 
regarding the DAT Plan. (R. 144-47.) A dozen citizens expressed their views regarding 
both the DAT Plan and the Parks and Rec plans, including Plaintiffs' counsel. After the 
public hearing was closed, the City voted to amend the West Jordan City General Plan to 
include the DAT Plan pertaining to the Sugar Factor Property (the "Plan Amendment"). 
(R. 149). The Plan Amendment did not change zoning, but merely amended the City's 
General Plan. 
Unhappy with the City Council's decision, Plaintiffs filed their 
Petition/Complaint. (R. 1). Plaintiffs' sought judicial review of the Plan Amendment 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 10-9-1001. (R. 1-2; 10-13). Specifically, Plaintiffs 
claimed that the City failed to follow City ordinances in adopting the Plan Amendment 
and that the Plan Amendment itself failed to comply with certain ordinances. (R. 7-13). 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order enjoining the City from 
acting on the Plan Amendment. (R. 99-108). 
At a May 21, 2001, hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining 
Order, the City stipulated to refrain from taking any binding action in furtherance of the 
Plan Amendment, without first giving Plaintiffs 45 days notice. (R. 332-35). 
Specifically, the City stipulated that it would not take any action to sell, lease, encumber 
or rezone the Sugar Factory Property or enter into any binding contracts that would 
commit the City to sell, lease, encumber or rezone the Sugar Factory Property without 
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giving notice. (R. 334). Accordingly, the District Court denied Plaintiffs' motion, 
finding there was no irreparable harm. On July 11, 2001, the City submitted an order 
reflecting the May 21 hearing, in which the District Court denied Plaintiffs' motion. This 
order was signed on June 28, 2002. (R. 334). 
On June 19, 2001, the City Council authorized the City Staff to pursue an 
agreement with French and Associates ("French"), under which French would produce a 
series of digital images showing what the Sugar Factory Property would look like under 
the DAT Plan. (R. 692-94). The City Council voted to authorize up to $20,000 for these 
images, but later reduced that amount to $15,000. (R. 697). 
The proposal with French would not have sold or leased the Sugar Factory 
Property. It was simply to produce images of what future development may look like. 
(R. 692-94). More importantly, the City Staff eventually decided not to enter into the 
agreement with French and no monies were expended on the images. (R. 689). 
Accordingly, no notice was given to Plaintiffs. 
In late October 2001, well after the City had first authorized the agreement with 
French, which ultimately was not entered into, the Stipulation was amended. (R. 485, 
487). Under this amendment, the City was precluded from awarding any contract 
affecting the Sugar Factory Property, without giving notice. (R.487). Even under the 
amended Stipulation, no notice was required because no contract was awarded. 
During the course of this litigation, the citizens of West Jordan collected 
signatures to place Citizens City Initiative No. 1 (the "Initiative") on the November 
ballot. (R. 689). Under the Initiative, a majority of the City's voters would have to 
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approve any sale, lease or transfer of City property, including the Sugar Factory Property. 
(R. 689). The Initiative was certified on August 14, 2001 and passed in the November 
election. (R. 689). 
Under the newly passed Initiative, the City could not take action to sell, lease or 
transfer property as contemplated by the DAT Plan and the Plan Amendment. Thus, the 
Plan Amendment was effectively nullified by the Initiative. Accordingly, on November 
13, 2001, the City passed Ordinance No. 01-56, which repealed the Plan Amendment. 
(R. 703). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the District Court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
The District Court correctly ruled that Plaintiffs were not entitled to attorney's fees 
pursuant to the private attorney general doctrine since they were not "prevailing parties". 
Specifically, Plaintiffs did not obtain a judgment in their favor, nor were they granted 
relief on the merits through a Court ordered change in conduct. Plaintiffs also should be 
denied fees because they failed to show that the violation of a land use ordinance, or the 
preservation of park property, rises to the level of important public policy, as required by 
the private attorney general doctrine. Finally, Plaintiffs cannot show that "but for" their 
action, the Plan Amendment was repealed. 
The District Court also properly dismissed Plaintiffs' causes of action for 
declaratory relief, judicial review of the Plan Amendment and injunctive relief, since the 
Plan Amendment was repealed and no justiciable controversy remained. Additionally, 
the District Court correctly determined that Utah Code Ann. Section 77-6-1 does not give 
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rise to a private right of action to remove government officials, but rather provides for 
city, county and state attorneys to prosecute such actions. As such, the District Court 
correctly dismissed Plaintiffs' cause of action to remove the City's validly elected Mayor 
and City Council members. 
Because the contempt hearing in this matter was initiated at the District Court's 
request, and to vindicate its own authority, the District Court correctly applied the 
criminal standard of review to the Order to Show Cause hearing. Under that standard, the 
District Court correctly determined that the City did not violate the Stipulation and 
therefore was not in contempt. However, even if the civil standard should have been 
applied, the Plaintiffs are without remedy since no contract was awarded and the 
Plaintiffs were not injured. 
Finally, the District Court did not err in failing to require specific findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. Because the City's motions were largely brought pursuant to 
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), specific findings of fact were not required. Nor would the 
failure to issue such findings constitute a basis for overturning the District Court's 
dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER 
THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL EXCEPTION TO THE 
TRADITIONAL AMERICAN RULE GOVERNING ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Plaintiffs claim that the District Court erred procedurally and substantively in 
dismissing Plaintiffs' cause of action for attorney's fees under the private attorney 
general doctrine. To support this argument, Plaintiffs ignore the facts and relevant law 
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and misrepresent the District Court's conduct. An analysis under the actual facts and law 
confirms that the District Court correctly denied Plaintiffs attorney's fees. 
A. The District Court Did Not Commit Procedural Error in Dismissing 
Plaintiffs' Cause of Action for Attorney's Fees. 
Plaintiffs repeatedly state that the District Court dismissed their attorney's fees 
cause of action without opportunity to be heard. Repeating a statement over and over 
does not make it true. The fact is, the issue of Plaintiffs' entitlement to attorney's fees 
was fully briefed and argued, and was addressed by the District Court on more than one 
occasion. 
It is true that the District Court initially dismissed the attorney's fee claim without 
being moved by the City. Plaintiffs immediately moved to reconsider the dismissal, 
submitting a brief which argued that fees were awardable in this case under the private 
attorney general doctrine. (R. 588-90). Following briefing, on November 28, 2001, the 
District Court heard oral argument on the attorney's fees issue. (R. 801). After 
argument, the District Court reaffirmed its initial ruling, finding that 
The only cause of action under which arguably there would have been any 
kind of prevailing argument would be under the first cause of action, but in fact, it 
wasn't any decision of this Court that resulted in overturning the actions of the 
City Council but rather the City Council itself reconsidering its action in light of 
changed political realities. I believe that plaintiffs have performed an important 
service but I do not find that it rises to the level for recoupment of private attorney 
general fees under our theory of private attorney general. 
(R. 801, pgs. 45-46). 
Undeterred, Plaintiffs' again put the issue before the District Court by filing a 
second motion for reconsideration. Once again, Plaintiffs argued they were entitled to 
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fees and briefed this issue. For a second time, the District Court addressed and rejected 
Plaintiffs' claims. (R. 789-92). 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' argument that the attorney's fees issue was dismissed 
without an opportunity to be heard is completely misguided. There was no denial of due 
process, as Plaintiffs were heard not once, but twice. Consequently, the dismissal of the 
attorney's fees claim is not subject to reversal based upon any procedural deficiencies. 
B. The District Court Correctly Determined That Plaintiffs Were Not Entitled to 
Attorney's Fees. 
Plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney's fees under the private attorney general 
doctrine. Utah has long adhered to the rule that "attorney fees cannot be recovered unless 
a statute or contract authorizes such an award." Stewart v. Utah Public Service Comm'n, 
885 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994). The private attorney general exception to the general 
rule requires Plaintiffs to establish that (1) they are the "prevailing party"; (2) they 
successfully vindicated an important public policy for broad public benefit; and (3) that 
"but for" their action, the vindicated public policy would not have come about. Id. at 
783. The Court has noted that any award of attorney fees under this doctrine "will take 
an [] extraordinary case." Id. at 783, n.19. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly refused to 
apply the private attorney general exception. See, e.g., Faust v. KAI Technologies, 2000 
UT 82 ffll7-19, 15 P.3d 1266, 1269 (declining to award fees under private attorney 
general exception because case did not involve "extraordinary" circumstances). 
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1. Plaintiffs were not the "prevailing party". 
Plaintiffs concede that to be entitled to attorney's fees under the private attorney 
general exception, they must have been "prevailing parties." (Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 
25-30 (arguing District Court erred in "holding that Plaintiffs were not a "prevailing 
party.")).2 It is well established that a "prevailing party" is "[a] party in whose favor a 
judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount of damages awarded." A.K. & R. 
Whipple Plumb, and Heat. v. Guy, 2002 UT App 73 f 11, 47 P.3d 92, 95 (2002) 
(emphasis added) (quotations omitted). To be a prevailing party, a "party must obtain at 
least some relief on the merits of the party's claim or claims." Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 
33131, 44 P.3d 781, 793. In other words, there must be some judicial relief afforded on 
the merits. See Buckhannon Bd. v. West Virginia D.H.H.R., 532 U.S. 598, 604-05 (2001). 
a. Plaintiffs did not receive a judgment or relief on the merits. 
In this case, a judgment was not rendered in Plaintiffs' favor. In fact, each and 
every cause of action was dismissed. Nor was there even a procedural victory for 
Plaintiffs. Each and every motion filed by Plaintiffs was denied. 
In a desperate attempt to fall under the definition of "prevailing party", Plaintiffs 
argue that they "succeeded in obtaining injunctive relief against Defendants which was 
entered by the court" (Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 20) and that "Plaintiffs did, in fact, 
obtain an order granting relief in this action" (Id. at 26). Whether these statements are 
2
 In Stewart, this Court held that to be entitled to fees, a party must be "successful." 885 
P.2d at 783. A "successful party" and a "prevailing party", however, are synonymous. 
A.K. & R. Whipple Plumb, and Heat. v. Guy, 2002 UT App 73111, 47 P.3d 92, 95 
(2002). 
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mere exaggerations or intentional misstatements is unclear. What is clear, however, is 
that these allegations are incorrect. 
The District Court specifically held, in its order addressing Plaintiffs' first motion 
for injunctive relief, that "the court hereby denies plaintiffs9 Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order because plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they will suffer 
irreparable harm if a temporary restraining order is not issued." (R. 333.) Plaintiffs' 
"renewed" motion for Preliminary Injunction was also denied. (R. 487-88.) The District 
Court specifically held that "Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the requirements of 
Utah R. Civ. Pro. 65A . . . have not posted a security bond . . . [and] have failed to make 
the necessary threshold showing to establish the grounds for issuance of a preliminary 
injunction." (Id.). There simply was no judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. 
b. Plaintiffs are not a "prevailing party" under the catalyst theory. 
Recognizing that they are not prevailing parties as defined by Utah law, Plaintiffs 
argue that a party may prevail "even though there was no judicial order or judgment that 
compelled the governmental body to change the action complained of by the citizens." 
(Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 27). This doctrine is commonly referred to as the "catalyst 
theory". It previously found some support in federal court decisions. (See Plaintiffs' 
Opening Brief at 28, n. 25). However, these federal decisions were effectively 
overturned by the United States Supreme Court's repudiation of the catalyst theory in 
Buchannon Bd. v. West Virginia D.H.H.R., 532 U.S. 598 (2001). 
In Buchannon, the United States Supreme Court rejected the "catalyst theory" as a 
basis to award fees, holding that a "prevailing party" is only one where the plaintiff has 
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604-05. (citations omitted). The Supreme Court further explained that 
A defendant's voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps accomplishing what 
the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial 
imprimatur on the change. Our precedents thus counsel against holding that the 
term "prevailing party" authorizes an award of attorney's fees without a 
corresponding alteration in the legal relationship of the parties. 
Id. at 605. (emphasis added). 
This Court recently adopted this rationale, albeit in the civil rights context. In 
Crank v. Utah Judicial Council, this Court held that a prevailing party is one who obtains 
at least some relief on the merits, whether pursuant to a judgment or a court ordered 
consent decree approving a settlement. 2001 UT 9 f 38, 20 P.3d 307, 317. A "prevailing 
party" requires some form of legally mandated modification in behavior. Id. Rejecting 
the "catalyst theory" argument that a lawsuit does bring about change, the Court noted 
In one sense, litigation often alters or affects the behavior of the litigants 
merely by its institution or renewal. The abandonment of informal methods of 
dispute resolution in favor of a formal, adversarial appeal to authority usually 
chills the relationship between the parties, and results in a significantly diminished 
degree of trust. The formalization of such relationships then manifests itself in an 
increased attention to the strict legal requirements of the relationship. That sort 
of alteration, by itself, cannot be the type of behavioral modification of which 
[the Supreme Court] speaks. [The Supreme Court] instead refers to legally-
mandated modifications of behavior brought about as a direct result of the 
suit. In this case, it seems likely that Crank's second suit has instilled a certain 
heightened degree of circumspectness in the Council's adherence to the procedural 
details of the Agreement. However, that alteration alone does not confer 
prevailing party status on Crank. 
Id. at f 38, n. 14. (emphasis added). See also, Taylor v. City of Lenoir, 558 S.E.2d 242 
(N.C. App. 2002) (finding plaintiff was not a prevailing party since "although it is 
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possible that this lawsuit may have had some impact upon the [defendant] City's" 
voluntary decision, the conversion "was not a legally enforceable action required by 
judgment, or an order or a court approved settlement of the trial court."). 
This standard, as set forth by the United States Supreme Court, was the standard 
applied by the District Court in this matter. The District Court's decision is further 
supported by public policy, which favors rejection of the catalyst theory. First, the public 
policy argument raised by Plaintiffs in support of the catalyst theory, namely that a 
governmental agency could cease the allegedly unlawful activity on the eve of an adverse 
ruling, was expressly rejected by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court noted that "we 
are skeptical of these assertions, which are entirely speculative and unsupported by any 
empirical evidence." Buchannon, 532 U.S. at 608. 
Second, punishing a defendant for changing questionable actions serves as a 
disincentive to achieve actual change. As the United States Supreme Court noted, "[t]he 
defendant's potential liability for fees in this kind of litigation can be as significant as, 
and sometimes even more significant than, their potential liability on the merits and the 
possibility of being assessed attorney's fees may well deter a defendant from altering its 
conduct." Id. (quotations omitted). In other words, if the goal is to achieve a change in 
policy or practice, then the threat of attorney's fees for a voluntary change only serves to 
harden the defendant's position and protract litigation. Contrary to Plaintiffs' arguments, 
the policy of change as well as the "rapid resolution of disputes" is in fact deterred by use 
of the catalyst theory. 
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Third, "a request for attorney's fees should not result in a second major litigation. 
Id. at 609 (quotations omitted). "[A] "catalyst theory" hearing would require analysis of 
the defendant's subjective motivations in changing its conduct, an analysis that will likely 
depend on a highly fact-bound inquiry and may turn on reasonable inferences from the 
nature and timing of the defendant's change in conduct." Id. This process would be 
extremely difficult and not easily administered.3 
For these reasons, both this Court and the United States Supreme Court have 
rejected the catalyst theory. It should not form a basis for establishing Plaintiffs as 
"prevailing parties." 
2. Plaintiffs have not shown that they vindicated an important public 
policy for broad public benefit. 
Plaintiffs put forth two allegedly important public policies that they claim to have 
vindicated through this action. The first is Plaintiffs' claim that they obtained redress for 
the violation of a statute or ordinance by a government body. (Plaintiffs' Opening Brief 
at 25). Second, Plaintiffs claim they sought the protection of city parklands. Plaintiffs 
have not shown, however, that these public policies rise to the level contemplated by the 
private attorney general exception. 
3
 Proof of this risk can be found in Plaintiffs conduct in this matter. In their Second 
Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiffs requested the opportunity to conduct discovery, in 
part to discover evidence as to the rationale behind the City Council's decision to repeal 
the Amendment. (R. 744-49). 
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a. Violation of an ordinance does not necessarily not rise to the 
level of important public policy. 
Plaintiffs argue that the violation of any municipal land use ordinance rises to the 
level of "important public policy" covered by the attorney general exception. To support 
this argument, Plaintiffs rely upon Woodland Hill Residents Assoc. Inc., et. al. v. City 
Council of Los Angeles, 593 P.2d 200 (Cal. 1979). Woodland Hill does not support 
Plaintiffs' position. 
First, in Woodland Hill, the California court applied a statutory version of the 
private attorney general doctrine. The statute specifically provided for attorney's fees 
where an important right is at issue, regardless of its source - "constitutional, statutory or 
other." Id. at 203. Contrary to Plaintiffs' contention, however, this did not include every 
potential statutory violation. While Woodland Hill stated that "[o]f course, the public 
always has a significant interest in seeing that legal strictures are properly enforced" -
Plaintiffs conveniently ignore the language immediately following, which stated 
Both the statutory language ("significant benefit") and prior case law, however, 
indicate that the Legislature did not intend to authorize an award of attorney 
fees in every case involving a statutory violation. We believe rather that the 
Legislature contemplated that in adjudicating a motion for attorney fees under 
section 1021.5, a trial court would determine the significance of the benefit, as 
well as the size of the class receiving benefit, from a realistic assessment, in light 
of all the pertinent circumstances, of the gains which have resulted in a particular 
case. 
Id. (emphasis added). In short, Woodland Hill specifically rejected Plaintiffs' contention 
that every statutory violation implicated an important public policy. 
This qualification in Woodland Hill finds support in the statutory structure of 
Utah's municipal land laws. Under Utah Code Ann. Section 10-9-1001, a person may 
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appeal a governmental agency's land use decision. On that appeal, the court must 
"determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." The Utah 
Legislature, however, chose not to include a specific award for attorney's fees if in fact 
the land use decision is determined to be illegal. 
Moreover, this Court has previously ruled, albeit implicitly, that not every 
violation of the land use laws warrants relief, let alone fees. "The City's failure to pass 
the legality requirement of section 10-9-100l(3)(b), however, does not automatically 
entitle Plaintiffs to the relief they request... [but rather the Plaintiffs must prove] 
how, if at all, the City's decision would have been different and what relief, if any, 
they are entitled to as a result." Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of 
Springville, 979 P.2d 332, 338 (Utah 1999) (emphasis added). If the express violation of 
the statue may not even entitle an aggrieved party to relief, it is hard to imagine that fees 
must be awarded. 
In short, not every violation of an ordinance warrants attorney's fees under the 
private attorney general exception. As established by the Legislature and this Court, this 
is especially true with respect to land use decisions. To rule as Plaintiffs request would 
merely open the door to innumerable lawsuits, all requesting attorney's fees, which 
would serve only to drain precious governmental resources. 
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b. The Selling of City Property Does Not Necessarily Rise to the 
Level of Important Public Policy. 
A city government's decision to dispose of or sell city lands acquired for a park 
does not necessarily rise to the level of an important public policy contemplated by the 
private attorney general exception. While Plaintiffs cite to general treatises concerning 
the fact that public lands are held in trust, there can be no debate that a city has authority 
to sell or lease city property, even parks. Utah Code Ann. Section 10-8-2 provides that a 
city legislative body may "purchase, receive, hold, sell, lease, convey, and dispose of 
real and personal property for the benefit of the city, whether the property is within or 
without the city's corporate boundaries." (emphasis added). This includes park property. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-8. Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to show that a city's 
simple desire to sell or lease city property implicates an important public policy. 
C. The repeal of the Amendment did not occur "but for" Plaintiffs' action. 
Contrary to Plaintiffs' contention, the repeal of the Plan Amendment would have 
occurred regardless of Plaintiffs' lawsuit. On August 14, 2001, the City certified that 
sufficient signatures had been collected to place the Initiative on the November ballot. 
The Initiative called for the approval of a majority of West Jordan City voters before any 
sale, lease or transfer of City property, which included the property covered by the 
Amendment. The Initiative passed with 68% of the vote. 
The Plan Amendment was rendered meaningless by the Initiative. Accordingly, 
the City repealed the Plan Amendment on November 13, 2001, which rendered this 
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lawsuit moot. In other words, Plaintiffs may have achieved victory at the ballot box, but 
they did not achieve victory in this litigation. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' 
DECLARATORY RELIEF CLAIM BECAUSE THE ISSUES RAISED 
WERE MOOT. 
Plaintiffs requested the District Court to determine when and how a municipal 
body may dispose of city lands. This Court should uphold the District Court's dismissal 
of this claim for declaratory relief because the issues raised by Plaintiffs' claims were 
moot. 
This Court has repeatedly held that "[a] Declaratory Judgment Statute cannot be so 
construed as to authorize the courts to deliver advisory opinions or pronounce judgments 
on abstract questions, but there must be the invariable justiciable controversy present in 
such cases." Baird v. State, 51A P.2d 713, 716 (Utah 1978). There is no such 
controversy in this case. The Plan Amendment has been repealed. Any disposition of 
city lands now requires the consent of a majority of the citizens of West Jordan City. No 
ordinance currently portends to dispose of park property. There is simply no justiciable 
controversy. This alone merited dismissal of the declaratory judgment claim. Id. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' 
DECLARATORY RELIEF CAUSE OF ACTION BECAUSE THE CAUSE 
OF ACTION FAILED AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
To the extent Plaintiffs sought a judgment that cities cannot dispose of park 
property, this was clearly an untenable position. As noted previously, Utah Code Ann. 
Section 10-8-2 specifically allows a city legislative body to "purchase, receive, hold, sell, 
lease, convey, and dispose, of real and personal property for the benefit of the city, 
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whether the property is within or without the city's corporate boundaries." (emphasis 
added). Additionally, Utah Code Ann. Section 10-8-8 allows the city to vacate parks. 
There can be no question that a city legislative body employs such authority. 
Plaintiffs appear to rely upon McDonald v. Price for the proposition that cities do 
not possess the power to sell or dispose of park property. (Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 
33). This reliance is unfounded. First, the statutes cited above expressly provide cities 
with such authority. Second, the language quoted by Plaintiffs was dicta. Stone v. Salt 
Lake City, 356 P.2d 631 (Utah 1960) (noting McDonald language concerning parks was 
merely "dicta"). In fact, Plaintiffs themselves admit that park property may be sold or 
vacated, provided it is done pursuant to ordinance and with appropriate public hearings. 
(Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 32, 34). Thus, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs' declaratory 
judgment action fails. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERROR IN DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION TO REMOVE THE VALIDLY 
ELECTED CITY COUNCIL MEMBERS OF WEST JORDAN CITY. 
The District Court correctly held that Utah Code Ann. § 77-6-1 et seq. does not 
provide individuals a private right of action to remove city officers.4 To support their 
argument, Plaintiffs selectively quote § 77-6-2 that "[a]n action for the removal of a[n].. 
. officer of a city . . . may be initiated by any taxpayer." Conveniently, however, 
Plaintiffs fail to quote Utah Code Ann. § 77-6-4 in its entirety, which states 
(1) When the accusation is initiated by: 
4
 Plaintiffs did not initially bring their Complaint under this statute. Rather, Plaintiffs 
cited Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-826. In an untimely supplemental brief to the District 
Court, Plaintiffs finally put forth Utah Code Ann. § 77-6-1. 
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(a) a grand jury, the foreperson shall present the accusation to the 
court in the presence of the grand jurors which shall be filed with 
the clerk; or 
(b) a taxpayer, the county attorney, district attorney, or the 
attorney general, any of these persons shall present the 
accusation to the presiding judge of the district court for 
filing with the clerk. 
(2) (a) Except when the accusation is initiated by the county attorney 
or district attorney, the court shall furnish a copy of the accusation 
to the county attorney or, if within a prosecution district, the 
district attorney who shall investigate and may prosecute the 
accusation. 
(b) If the accusation is against the county or district attorney, the court shall 
furnish a copy of the accusation to the Office of the Attorney General, who 
shall investigate and may prosecute the accusation. 
(c) If prosecution is pursued, the county attorney, district attorney, or 
attorney general shall serve a copy of the accusation on the defendant 
with a summons which requires the defendant to appear before the district 
court of the county in which the county attorney or district attorney serves 
and to answer the accusation. 
(3) The time fixed for appearance may not be less than ten days from the 
date of service of summons. The service of the accusation, summons, 
and the return of service shall be made in the manner provided by law 
for service of civil process. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-6-1 et. al, read in its entirety, reveals that a citizen may 
make out a sworn accusation and file it with the presiding judge. After this sworn 
accusation is made, the district attorney or the attorney general then conducts the 
investigation and supervises the litigation, if any. That is entirely consistent with this 
Court's holding that this statute is "quasi criminal in nature" and should be prosecuted by 
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the appropriate governmental officials. State v. Jones, 407 P.2d 571, 572 (Utah 1965). 
Moreover, 
the statute should be strictly construed against the authority invoking it, as it 
directly implicates the principle, fundamental in our democracy, that the privilege 
of choosing and electing public officials, and repudiating them if and when they so 
desire, belongs exclusively to the people; and that neither the courts nor any other 
authority should be hasty to encroach upon that right. 
Id at 575. 
In this matter, Plaintiffs failed to bring their action before the presiding judge of 
the District Court. Furthermore, there was no sworn accusation of wrongdoing. And 
even if there were, the district attorney has control over the investigation and litigation. 
Utah appellate courts have routinely noted that "the courts of this state are not generally 
in the habit of implying a private right of action based upon state law, absent some 
specific direction from the legislature." Broadbent v. Bd. OfEduc. Of Cache Cty., 910 
P.2d 1274, 1278 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert, denied, 917 P.2d 556 (Utah 1996). In fact, 
Utah Courts have gone to great lengths to emphasize that the judiciary should not create 
private rights of action based upon statutes. See, e.g., Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 
P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1974) (stating criminal statute did not provide private right of action, 
but that matter was best left to legislature); J.H. by D.H. v. West Valley City , 840 P.2d 
115, 125 (Utah 1992) (declining to create private right of action to challenge city's failure 
to follow statutory procedures in hiring officers); Nelson v. Div. Of Peace Officer 
Standards & Training, 851 P.2d 1201, 1204 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (holding private citizen 
had not right to compel agency to conduct disciplinary hearings). 
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In this matter, there is nothing to suggest that the statute creates a private right of 
action. The taxpayer's role begins and ends at the filing of the sworn accusation. 
Plaintiffs' cited statute simply does not support Plaintiffs' fifth cause of action, which 
seeks to control the investigation into the City's actions. Accordingly, the trial court did 
not err in dismissing this cause of action. 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' 
FIRST AND SECOND CAUSES OF ACTION. 
Plaintiffs' argument that the District Court erred by dismissing, sua sponte, the first 
two causes of action shows a complete lack of understanding regarding a court's 
jurisdiction. For a court to exercise jurisdiction over a matter, there must be a justiciable 
controversy. Baird, 574 P.2d at 716. ("When it is ascertained that there is no 
jurisdiction in the court because of the absence of a justiciable controversy, then the court 
can go no further, and its immediate duty is to dismiss the action . . . . " ) . In fact, "the 
question of justiciable controversy is of such importance as to require the court to raise it 
sua sponte, if the parties neglect or fail to do so." Williams v. University of Utah. 626 
P.2d 500 (Utah 1981) (emphasis added). 
In this case, by the November 28, 2001 hearing, only Plaintiffs' first and second 
causes of action remained. Both of those causes of action were predicated on a finding 
that the Plan Amendment was illegal and no action should be taken on it. During the 
November 28 hearing, the District Court learned that the Plan Amendment had been 
repealed. As such, Plaintiffs' first and second causes of action were moot. Because they 
259145_1 
27 
were moot, the District Court was required, sua sponte, to dismiss the action. Therefore, 
the District Court did not err in dismissing Plaintiffs' remaining causes of action. 
Moreover, Plaintiffs' arguments that they were somehow denied the opportunity to 
conduct discovery are misguided. Plaintiffs were not entitled to conduct discovery. 
Plaintiffs' remaining causes of action were simply a request for review of the City's land 
use decisions. These are causes of actions brought under Utah Code Ann. Section 10-9-
1001, alleging that the Plan Amendment was illegal. The determination of whether the 
Amendment was illegal is not a matter for taking new evidence. 
Review under Section 10-9-1001 constitutes an appeal of the legislative body's 
decision rather than a trial de novo. This review is limited to the record and the evidence 
presented to and considered by the City's legislative body when it adopted the 
Amendment. See, e.g., Springville Citizens v. City ofSpringville, 979 P.2d 332, 336-37 
(Utah 1999) (evaluating whether city's land use decisions are arbitrary, capricious or 
illegal, "in light of the evidence before the city . . . " ) ; Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City, 
997 P.2d 321, 329 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (determining that "the city council, upon the 
record before it, could have reasonably" reached its decision.(emphasis added)). 
Because this matter was an appeal rather than a trial de novo, new evidence was not 
needed and discovery not warranted. Thus, the District Court correctly denied Plaintiffs' 
259145.1 
28 
the opportunity to conduct discovery.5 
Finally, it is difficult to imagine what evidence, if any, Plaintiffs needed to 
discover. The basis of their claim was that the Plan Amendment was illegal and that the 
City should be precluded from acting upon it. Regardless of the merits of this claim, the 
Plan Amendment had been repealed. There was no need for discovery, even if it were 
allowable under the statute. 
Thus, the District Court did not err in precluding discovery. Nor did the District 
Court err in dismissing an action that was obviously moot. 
VI. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT DEFENDANTS 
WERE NOT IN CRIMINAL CONTEMPT. 
Plaintiffs next argue that the District Court erred by employing the standard for 
criminal contempt. Determining whether the contempt proceeding was civil or criminal 
in nature directly affects this appeal in two ways. First, the elements of contempt "must 
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal contempt proceeding, and by clear and 
convincing evidence in a civil contempt proceeding." Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 
1162, 1172 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted). And second, a trial court's decision in 
criminal contempt cases is left "in the sound discretion of the [trial] court" while civil 
5
 At the District Court, Plaintiffs also argued the were entitled to discovery absent 
complying with Utah R. Civ. P. 26, since they were bringing this action under Utah R. 
Civ. P. 65B. The District Court heard this argument and held that "Plaintiffs' belated 
contention in some of their submissions that their Complaint sought extraordinary relief 
under Utah R. Civ. Pro. is simply incorrect.... Plaintiffs disingenuous claim is belied by 
the entire record and discussion with the court at the time of the May 2001 hearing and 
thereafter. Plaintiffs clearly did not satisfy the requirement of either Rule 65A or 65 B 
and therefore their request was properly denied." (R. 791.) 
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contempt orders "do[] not lie within the discretion of the trial court." Butler v. Butler, 
461 P.2d 727, 729-30 (Utah 1969). 
This Court has recognized the difference between civil and criminal contempt as 
follows: 
The primary determinant of whether a particular contempt order is to be 
labeled civil or criminal is the trial court's purpose in entering the order. A 
contempt order is criminal if its purpose is to vindicate the court's 
authority, as by punishing an individual for disobeying an order, even if the 
order arises from civil proceedings. A contempt order is civil if it has a 
remedial purpose, either to coerce an individual to comply with a court 
order given for the benefit of another party or to compensate an aggrieved 
party for injuries resulting from the failure to comply with an order. It is 
important to note that it is the purpose, not the method of the punishment, 
that serves to distinguish the two types of proceedings. 
Von Hake, 759 P.2d at 1168 (citations omitted). Thus the purpose of the contempt 
proceeding is essential. 
In an attempt to invoke the standard for civil contempt, Plaintiffs have 
misconstrued the trial court's actions in this matter. Plaintiffs claim that "[t]he trial court 
treated Plaintiffs' renewed motion for injunctive relief as a request for an order to show 
cause why Defendants should not be held in contempt." (Plaintiffs' Brief at 40.) This, 
however, is not the case. The trial court entertained Plaintiffs' renewed motion for a 
preliminary injunction and denied the motion because Plaintiffs failed to comply with 
Utah R. Civ. Pro. 65A, failed to post a security bond, and failed "to make the necessary 
showing to establish the grounds for issuance of a preliminary injunction." (R. 487-88) 
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The Court then, "on its own motion issue[d] an order to show cause why Defendants 
should not be held in contempt for [an] apparent violation." Id. at 2.6 
The court then conducted a hearing to determine whether the City had violated the 
Stipulation. At that proceeding the District Court, applying the criminal contempt 
standard, determined that "the actions of the City cannot be found to have been violative 
of the orders of the court beyond a reasonable doubt." (R. 180 at 44.) As such, the 
District Court "did not find defendants in contempt." Id. 
Under these facts it becomes clear that the contempt proceeding was criminal in 
nature. The purpose of the contempt hearing was not to coerce the City to comply with 
the Stipulation, as required in civil contempt, but instead to determine whether the City 
had already violated the Stipulation. Likewise, the purpose of the hearing was not to 
compensate Plaintiffs for injuries resulting from the alleged failure to comply with the 
Stipulation, as Plaintiffs suffered no injury. Instead, the purpose of the contempt 
proceedings was to determine if the District Court's authority had been disregarded, and 
to punish the responsible party if it had. That purpose is further evidenced by the fact 
that the District Court initiated the order to show cause on its own motion, and "not really 
at plaintiff's instance." (R. 180 at 43.) As such, the District Court properly applied the 
6
 See also, Minute Entry and Decision on Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration 1/18/02 
(Although the court denied Plaintiffs' Motion [for preliminary injunction], some of 
Plaintiffs' allegations regarding Defendants' actions concerned the court enough that, on 
its own motion, the court scheduled an Order to Show Cause ("OSC") hearing to 
determine if Defendants had violated the terms of a stipulation entered in court in May 
2001 \ (R.789.) 
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criminal contempt standard, and, because there is no evidence that the District Court 
abused its discretion, the finding of no contempt should be upheld. 
Furthermore, because the contempt proceeding was criminal instead of civil, the 
dispute is between the trial court and parties allegedly in contempt. In such a case, the 
court employs the contempt mechanism to vindicate its own authority not to protect any 
right of the opposing party. Accordingly, the opposing party (Plaintiffs in this case) has 
no authority to appeal the trial court's finding of no contempt. To hold otherwise would 
allow Plaintiffs to step in the place of the court and violate the courts discretion in 
criminal contempt matters. Certainly, Plaintiffs lack authority to do so. 
Finally, even if the Court decides that District Court erred and should have 
employed the civil contempt standard, Plaintiffs' arguments fail because the evidence 
supports the District Court's finding and there was no available remedy for the alleged 
civil contempt because Plaintiffs suffered no injury. First, the undisputed evidence in this 
case shows that the disputed contract was never entered into with French. Second, the 
proposed contract with French would not have been pursuant to the City's outstanding 
RFP concerning the Sugar Factory property, or any other RFP. It would have simply 
been a contract to provide staff services and would not have bound the City in any way to 
take actions objected to by Plaintiffs. Thus, the agreement, which never came about, was 
not covered by the Stipulation. Accordingly, the District Court correctly determined 
there was not a violation of the Stipulation and that contempt was not warranted. 
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VII. THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDERS SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED FOR 
FAILURE TO ENTER SPECIFIC FINDNGS OF FACT. 
Plaintiffs, apparently unfamiliar with Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, incorrectly argue that the trial court erred by failing to enter findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. Rule 52(a) governs the necessity and substance of findings by 
trial court judges. Because it is unclear which decision(s) Plaintiffs are attacking for 
failure to enter adequate findings and conclusions, the City will attempt to address each 
group of decisions separately. 
A. Dismissal of the Complaint/Petition 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil procedure states in part: 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, 
the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of 
law thereon . . . . The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). 
The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for 
its decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 
59 when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(emphasis added). In this case, none of Plaintiffs' claims were tried upon the facts 
without a jury. Instead, Plaintiffs' claims were dismissed under Defendants' Rule 12(b) 
motion and Defendants' oral motion to dismiss count 1 following the rescission of the 
contested ordinance. Rule 52(a), therefore, makes it clear that no findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are necessary. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by failing to 
enter findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Instead, Rule 52(a) simply requires that the trial court "issue a brief written 
statement of the ground for its decision." This Court has recognized that the substance 
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required in a brief written statement under Rule 52(a) is minimal and can be satisfied 
merely by stating "that [the trial court] agreed with the argument and citation of 
authorities stated in each of the [defendant's] points in its motion . . . . " Neerings v. Utah 
State Bar, 817 P.2d 320, 323 (Utah, 1991). As such, the minute entries entered by the 
court on October 22, 2001 and January 18, 2002, as well as the final order, signed by the 
court on December 20, 2001, give ample explanation of the grounds for dismissing 
Plaintiffs' case. 
Finally, even if the Court concludes that the trial court failed to satisfy the 
requirements of a brief written statement under Rule 52(a), that is not grounds for 
reversible error: 
A more important reason for inclusion of the requirement that the trial court 
state the ground for its decision in summary judgment cases is 
administrative in nature in that it would provide a ready basis for review on 
appeal. However, also from the administrative point of view, failure to 
state the grounds for its decision would not constitute reversible error. 
Rather, in an appropriate case, failure to do so may only justify remand to 
the trial court. 
Neerings, 817 P.2d at 323. At most, then, the appropriate remedy would be to remand 
the case to the District Court with instructions to more fully state the reasons for 
dismissal. In any case, there are no grounds for reversible error under Rule 52(a). 
B. Contempt Proceedings 
The City would agree that findings of fact and conclusions of law are generally 
required when issuing an order of contempt. See e.g. Utah v. Hurst, 821 P.2d 467, 469-
71 (Utah App. Ct. 1991) (recognizing that findings in criminal contempt may be oral or 
written). Assuming that Plaintiffs have the authority to challenge a finding of no criminal 
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contempt,7 Plaintiffs have failed to present any case law requiring findings of fact and 
conclusions of law when a trial court finds that no contempt has occurred. However, 
even if the District Court is required to enter findings and conclusions in this case, no 
error can be assigned because the District Court did in fact enter sufficient findings and 
conclusions. Again, Rule 52(a) sets the standard: 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, 
the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of 
law thereon . . . . It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions 
of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of 
the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by 
the court. . . . 
Utah R. Civ. Pro. 52(a). 
The court of appeals has found that findings of fact in a criminal contempt 
proceeding need not be written separately, but may be "gleaned from the 
transcript, the opinion or the memorandum decision." Hurst, 821 P.2d at 471. 
However, "'the ultimate test of the adequacy of a trial judge's findings is whether 
they are sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent to the issues to provide a basis 
for decision.'" Id. (quoting 9 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 2579 (1971)). 
At the conclusion of the contempt hearing, the Trial Court orally stated its findings 
of fact and conclusions of law as follows: 
Regardless of who is actually prosecuting this, I think that, in light of the 
standard for a contempt holding, I am satisfied that the actions of the City 
cannot be found to have been violative of the orders of the Court beyond a 
7
 See section VI above. 
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reasonable doubt. Accordingly, I do not hold and do not find defendants in 
contempt. 
(R.801 at 44.) Furthermore, the trial court's written Minute Entry and Decision also 
states: 
After the parties presented their positions at the OSC hearing the court 
determined that Defendants' actions appear to skirt the terms of the 
stipulation. However, the court could not conclude, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, whether the West Jordan City Council's actions were taken with 
reliable knowledge of, and intent to, violate the stipulation. Accordingly, 
the court determined to take no official action against Defendants, but 
warned Defendants against further actions in derogation of the stipulation. 
(R. 789-90.) 
These statements, gleaned from the transcript and minute entry and decision, are 
sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent to provide a basis for the decision. Most 
important is the trial court's finding that the City did not violate the stipulation 
agreement. As such, no additional findings of fact are required and the District Court's 
order of no contempt should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' appeal should be denied in its entirety and 
the District Court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' action, without attorney's fees, be affirmed. 
DATED this 23rd day of September, 2002. 
W. Ofllen Battle 
J. David Pearce 
Fabian & Clendenin, 
a Professional Corporation 
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